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DRAFT
GMS:hw

21 May 1955

SUBJECT: Possible Solution to the Early Warning Problem

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1. A month or so ago I asked [REDACTED] to prepare a study on all the moves that the Russians would have to take between the time that they had decided upon initiating intercontinental war between Russia and the United States and the time that they would actually be in a position to make such a thrust. On the basis of this study, it is proposed that we organize a collection plan which would be actively initiated during the stage of intense international strain which may occur before the actual outbreak of hostilities.

2. The purpose of this collection plan would be to provide information about Russia's hostile intentions which would not otherwise be received by U. S. intelligence sources. The key assumption of the plan is that the Russians, despite their declaration in connection with disarmament that no war can occur without massive movements of troops and that thus a system of stationary observers can provide all the warning needed—despite all this the Russians may within the next year or so be in a position to organize an intercontinental air or missile attack on the United States surreptitiously.

3. It is recognized that this is but one of several assumptions that one can make about Russian activity prior to the outbreak of war, and it is my belief that this assumption falls comfortably short of a 50-50 chance of being true. Nonetheless, in view of the consequences of

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a successful attack on the United States carried off without early warning, it is believed that CIA could very well afford to allocate money and personnel to the solution of the intelligence problems associated with this assumption.

4. The proposed plan would call for aggressive reconnaissance at the stage of intense international strain referred to above. Such reconnaissance would involve deep overflights of the Soviet Union by high-performance planes piloted by CIA foreign contract personnel, and the introduction into the Soviet Union by air, and possibly by sea, of agent personnel and of automatic collection recording and transmitting devices, provided such devices are available at the time.

5. Pure intelligence overflights require no further discussion. The problems of targeting, collection techniques, and the like could easily be worked out on the basis of the study [REDACTED] has been asked to provide.

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6. Certainly the most difficult problem is that of having available agent teams for the purposes described above. Any stand-by arrangement has built into it enormous difficulties. It would be my impression, however, that such teams can be formed, held and continue to be available for use on notice under the following assumptions:

a. Such teams would follow essentially the black base pattern developed by SR some years ago. In other words, they would go in equipped to sustain themselves without contact with

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the local population for a very considerable period of time, and they would be made up of three or more individuals per team.

b. A program of paramilitary exercises, including possibly some actual intelligence missions in the Chukotski Peninsula, the undefended northern coast of the USSR, the Sakhalin Islands, and possibly elsewhere in the world, involving infiltration and exfiltration, would be devised and carried through continuously until such times as the teams are needed.

7. With regard to the automatic collection devices, it is proposed that the teams referred to above be equipped with these, and that they undertake extensive exercises in connection with the U. S. Strategic Air Force operations. It is also proposed that these devices be introduced into the periphery of the Soviet orbit—Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Far East—in stripped down form (omitting transmitting equipment).

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